This third paper in the series is concerned with the situation in which one has virtually no idea whether an exploration opportunity is likely to be a money winner or just awful. Using a variant of the binomial method accounting for the probability that a well will result in successful hydrocarbon finding after a series of dry holes, we show that one can assess the corporate confidence and associated optimum working interest one should take in such an exploration opportunity when one ignores all information about the net present value (NPV). When a corporation wishes to modify the basic pattern to allow for an NPV, and to include a required corporate worth for the opportunity, we show how the corporate confidence and/or the optimum working interest have to be altered to allow for such a factor. When the corporation knows only a low value for the NPV, which is unprofitable, and a high value, which is extremely profitable, we show how one can incorporate this broad range of possibilities within the same binomial framework to assess the likely distribution of optimum working interest (for a fixed corporate confidence) or corporate confidence distribution (for a fixed working interest) for choices of corporate required worth.
INTRODUCTION
In the first two papers in this series Lerche, 2003a, 2003b) we provided measures of optimum working interest (OWI) in exploration projects that did not suffer from the drawbacks usually associated with utility-based methods. We showed how such estimates of OWI could be tied directly to the corporate confidence (pc) together with how uncertainty in costs, success probability, and net present value (NPV) for an opportunity influenced either the corporate confidence for fixed values of OWI, or OWI for fixed values of corporate confidence. In each situation, however, one had some idea of the worth of the opportunity in terms of estimated gains (or NPV=Gains -Costs) in relation to the costs required should one choose to participate in an opportunity.
This third paper in the series is concerned with the situation in which one has virtually no idea whether an opportunity is likely to be a money winner or just awful. Such situations can happen for example in developing nations where the contract one has can be rudely overturned without any rhyme or reason so one can lose whatever thoughts one had of profit. It may also happen that one has some huge reservoir but one has no idea whether oil and/or gas are present at all in the reservoir or even how it is compartmentalized. There is a general intuition that if one has both a large reservoir and also a smaller reservoir then the larger is likely to be more potentially lucrative, despite there being no information on whether either contains hydrocarbons. A corporation does not wish to miss out on the potential that such situations may be highly profitable; on the other hand it does not wish to over commit its resources if the situation should turn out to be worse than could possibly have been foreseen. Thus the NPV is a complete unknown. It is this type of situation that we investigate here.
II. BASIC METHODOLOGY a. Genesis
The basic idea behind the development of a procedure to assess the unknown has its genesis in a simple manner. Consider that one were to be interested in drilling n+1 independent wells, all with essentially the same characteristics of costs, C, and success probability, p s , and so failure probability, 1-p s . One first asks what is the probability that just one out of the n+1 wells will be successful? This probability is just
Alternatively, if one fixes the value of p c then the number of wells required can be written
In the form given by equation (2), p c is conventionally called the corporate confidence.
Consider now that a corporation has a budget equal to its risk tolerance, RT, and that the total estimated costs per well are C. Take it also that the corporation is prepared to take a fractional interest in each of the wells, at the working interest OWI. Then the number of wells the corporation can invest in is given by Equating N(corp) with n then yields a formula for the working interest that a corporation can take depending on its corporate confidence in the form
Note that this form of OWI dependence is similar, but not identical, in structure to that employed in the first two papers in this series Lerche, 2003a, 2003b) and does not have an automatic control that OWI always stay less than unity, nor does OWI depend on the NPV of the opportunity. Thus the formula has advantages and disadvantages: one disadvantage is that it then rates low and high NPV opportunities identically (for the same costs, success probabilities and corporate confidence). Such may be an appropriate matter at an early stage of an opportunityparticularly when some form of commitment is often needed and one does not have any idea about worth of the project. As we will show later, however, there are more sharply focused variations of the above argument that do allow some form of control on the worth of likely good versus likely poor projects. An advantage is that equation (4) provides a very quick procedure for assessing some dynamic OWI that a corporation should aim for. As such it is likely a very useful measure of where to consider risk of the opportunity. The fact that the OWI given by equation (4) can exceed unity (and will do so whenever RT>nC) means that one needs to add an "economic" control -such as lowering the budget represented by RT-or that one view high OWI values as providing a strong indication that the opportunities are likely to yield profit-or that one should be more confident (higher p c values) about an opportunity. A combination of all the above is also a distinct possibility as well.
While equation (4) provides some assessment of the OWI it is by no means the whole story. For instance we have used the somewhat cavalier definition of a successful probability, p s , without explaining just what is meant by successful. Usually success is taken to mean that at least one has a scientific success in that hydrocarbons are found even if the success is not commercial -i.e. anticipated gains are less than costs so that the 0>NPV>-C. This leads naturally to the second part of the argument where the NPV is considered. The third part of the argument then regards the NPV as highly uncertain so that the opportunity can range from one with a very poor outcome to one with a highly profitable result.
b. Inclusion of NPV
As we have noted in the first paper in this series (MacKay and Lerche, 2003a) conventional solutions to project investment are based on the basic expected value (EV) information; derived from the success chance (p s ), net present value (V) and cost (C) as:
and its associated variance σ 2 given by
Often a measure of uncertainty of a project is provided by the volatility, v, determined through v = σ/EV. A volatility v>>1 is usually taken to note that the EV is not a very trustworthy measure of the project worth and so such projects are usually considered with more corporate askance than projects with low volatility (v<<1), i.e. the corporate confidence in high volatility projects is lower than in low volatility projects, even if they have the same EV.
The probability P(W) of obtaining a worth greater than an amount W is then given by
Note that on W=0, there is 100% chance of obtaining a worth in excess of zero, so that a worth of zero corresponds directly to an NPV = -C. In reality a corporation would like the cumulative probability of obtaining a worth in excess of C, so that some profit is realizable. For the ubiquitous n+1 well argument we are now interested in the probability that one out of the n+1 will have a probability of a worth in excess of W and the rest will not.
One then replaces the argument in the subsection above with
or, alternatively if the corporate confidence is given, the number of wells required is then n = ln(1-p c (W))/ln(1-p s P(W)) (
The corresponding OWI formula can then be written
As one asks for a higher and higher required worth, W, P(W) decreases systematically, and so one needs a greater "effective" well number, n, and one takes a smaller and smaller working interest for a given corporate confidence. The corollary is that if one maintains a fixed OWI, then one has a corporate confidence given by
where N = (RT/C)/OWI. In this case, as P(W) decreases with increasing required worth values W, the corporate confidence also wanes.
c. Uncertainty on NPV for Fixed Worth Values
As noted at the beginning of this paper, the development being presented is designed to handle the situation where one is ignorant of the NPV value so one does not know ahead of time whether the opportunity is bad or good. However ,one does know what the corporation would like to have returned to it from any such investment. So choose some fixed value of worth, W. Also choose a distribution of the NPV to mimic what 184 A Binomial Approach to Selecting Optimum Working Interest: Corporate Risk and Corporate Confidence III. Ignorance is NOT Bliss it is one knows (if anything) about the financial prospects for the opportunity-but covering a wide range of NPV values so that good and bad assessments are included. Let this distribution be D(NPV).
Then one can compute an-NPV independent average OWI (for fixed corporate confidence) or average corporate confidence (for fixed OWI) using
where angular brackets denote an averaging over the NPV distribution D(NPV). One can also compute the standard errors on these estimated average values from
so that one has some idea of the stability of the estimates at different choices for required worth, W. We now illustrate these basic mathematical developments with some simple numerical illustrations using an Excel program specifically built to handle these problems-particularly because the Excel program interfaces smoothly with Crystal Ball™ ,and so one can most easily vary any desired distribution of NPV to evaluate different situations.
III. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
Consider the case where a corporation is prepared to commit costs, C, of $10MM, has a risk threshold of RT=$35MM, and estimates a success probability, p s =0.4. These parameters will be used in all the illustrations that follow so that one can view the different illustrations within a fixed framework and so make comparisons immediately. We follow the same subsection ordering as in the previous section of the paper.
a. Genesis Illustration
In this case there really is only one case to consider, which is the plot of OWI versus confidence probability because there are no other parameters involved. Shown in Figure 1 is the variation. Note that as one is prepared to accept a smaller level of confidence in a result then one can increase the working interest the corporation is prepared to consider. But when one requires a high degree of confidence in the opportunity, then the corporation is more risk averse and takes a smaller working interest, as was to be expected from the basic genesis argument.
b. Inclusion of NPV
Because of the intrinsic interest in the situation where the NPV is unknown (to be exhibited in the next subsection) here we consider two situations, one of high NPV at $100MM, and the other at the lower NPV of $20MM. The corporation is interested in determining what return it can likely expect in both cases, i.e. the corporation wishes to know what OWI it should take in the opportunity in relation to the corporate aim of achieving some worth. Shown on Figures 2 and 3 are the variations of OWI versus required worth for the two values of the corporate confidence of 85% and 95% respectively, with Figure 2 drawn for an NPV of $100MM, and Figure 3 for an NPV of $20MM. Note that if one is prepared to accept a lower confidence that one will make the required worth then one can invest in a higher OWI per opportunity in both situations, as was to be expected. Holding the OWI fixed rather then the corporate confidence enables one to investigate the OWI that a corporation could take in an opportunity. Shown on Figure  4 is the corporate confidence versus worth required for the two situations of an OWI of 25% and 50% respectively at an NPV of $20MM, while Figure 5 shows the same variables done for the situation of an NPV of $100MM. Note in both cases that one can maintain a higher corporate confidence at increasing worth for the situation of an OWI=25% rather than the higher value of OWI= 50% as was to be anticipated because one spends less money on each potential opportunity in the lower OWI situation and so spreads the risk of not obtaining a required worth to more situations (or less involvement per situation) and so one has a greater confidence for a given required worth that one will achieve the corporate aims. Figure 4 . Corporate confidence versus corporate required worth for the situation of an NPV of $20MM, and drawn for the two cases of 25% and 50% optimum Working Interest. 
c. Ignorance of NPV
When on truly believes there is little knowledge about the NPV then one has to resort to some form of Monte Carlo simulations. The first point to note is that the range of the NPV ids indeed known. For instance NPV can hardly be less than the total costs (negative) and, equally, the maximum possible NPV value can be assessed from the maximum volume of the reservoir. However, in between these two extremes it is the situation in a truly unknown opportunity that one has no idea whether the NPV is anything other than uniformly distributed between the two extremes ( if it were to be otherwise distributed then one has some knowledge other than just the extremes that one has used to curtail the possible distributions of NPV). In this section of the paper we deal solely with a uniformly distributed NPV that can range from -$5MM to +$100MM, as shown on Figure 6 , thereby encompassing situations that could be truly very poor and, equally, situations that could be exceedingly profitable for a corporation. Interest centers on the rage of OWI (or corporate confidence) in order to achieve some corporate goal of required worth. We have chosen a low required worth of $10MM, and also one of $40MM, in order to illustrate the differences that ensue with the NPV range shown in Figure 6 .
As depicted in Figure 7 for the case of a required worth of $10MM and a corporate confidence set at 95%, there is now a range of OWI values, reflecting directly the uncertain range of NPV values. Note from Figure 7 , that there is only a 10% chance one should take less than about an OWI of 13% in the opportunity, there is also about a 90% chance one should take less than about 52% OWI in the opportunity, and there is a 50% chance one should take around 45 % OWI in the opportunity. By way of contrast, as the required worth is raised to $40MM, but corporate confidence is held at 95%, Figure 8 indicates that one should, in general take a much lower OWI overall in the opportunity, with about a 90% chance one should take less than about 30% OWI, about a 50% chance one should take of order 12% OWI, and about 15% chance one should take some interest greater than zero. Figure 7 . Distribution of OWI values for the NPV distribution of Figure 6 when the corporate confidence is set at 95% and when the corporate required worth is $10MM. Figure 6 when the corporate confidence is set at 95% and when the corporate required worth is $40MM.
Reversing the argument, for a fixed OWI of 50%, one can plot the corresponding distribution of corporate confidence for different required worth choices. Shown on Figures 9 and 10 are the cumulative plots of corporate confidence for the NPV distribution given above, with Figure 9 Figure  6 when the OWI is set at 50% and when the corporate required worth is $10MM. Figure 10 . Distribution of corporate confidence values for the NPV distribution of Figure 6 when the OWI is set at 50% and when the corporate required worth is $40MM. 10 a worth of $40MM. Note that the corporate confidence is always less than about 95% in both situations and , indeed in the high worth situation of $40MM,stays less than bout 86% no matter what; in the low worth situation of $10MM, there is a small regime where one can have greater than about 95% confidence in taking an OWI of 50% despite the uncertainty in the NPV. But because of the narrow range of situations where such is represented, it would be foolhardy to do so.
If one lowers the OWI to 25% then for both the cases of low required worth ($10MM) and high required worth ($40MM), there is now a broader region with higher corporate confidence that one can have over 90% confidence in the opportunity, as shown in Figure 11 for the case of a worth of $10MM, and in Figure  12 for the case of a required worth of $40MM.
Thus the broad range of uncertainty of the NPV value is making itself felt in all cases through either the range of allowable OWI values for fixed corporate confidence at different required worth values, or through the lower corporate confidence distribution for fixed OWI values at different worth values. The risk here that a corporation undertakes depends on the confidence it is prepared to accept in the venture with the large range of uncertainty of the NPV value, together with the worth the corporation would like to achieve in the opportunity.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The problem a corporation faces when it has little idea of whether an opportunity is likely to be profitable or just plain awful is that it does not know what working interest to take in the project nor what confidence it should assign to the opportunity. The purpose of this third paper in the series dealing with corporate confidence and working interest has attempted to address the problem in two ways. First if one chooses to ignore completely anything at all to do with the possible NPV values then Figure 11 . Distribution of corporate confidence values for the NPV distribution of Figure 6 when the OWI is set at 25% and when the corporate required worth is $10MM. one can relate directly the OWI a corporation should take to a measure describing the corporate confidence. In this case one can also not assign any idea of the worth the corporation would like to receive from the opportunity. Such an involvement in an opportunity may be a necessary evil for a corporation in order to gain access rights to more lucrative venture possibilities as part of an overall strategic long range plan. Second, if the corporation is prepared to assess a most likely lowest value for the NPV and also a highest, but to have no knowledge of any thing else, then we showed how one can use this information in both deterministic and stochastic manners to assess the working interest , or corporate confidence, one should place in such an opportunity, depending on the worth the corporation would like to achieve from the opportunity.
At the very least one can set a range of working interest possibilities that a corporation should be prepared to consider for such speculative ventures and see if they fit within a corporate mandated framework of risk. And that has been the main point of this paper. The problem of being ignorant is that the risk increases with any involvement undertaken, as does the corporate lack of confidence in such involvement. One cannot be confident at all about an outcome of profitability to the corporation, but, equally, one cannot afford to by-pass what might be an extremely lucrative opportunity. Ignorance is not bliss in this case, but also is not something one can walk away from without good reason and /or quantitative assessment of what it might require of a corporation. This paper has shown how to handle such problems of ignorance in relation to corporate goals. Figure 6 when the OWI is set at 25% and when the corporate required worth is $40MM.
